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“Bit[ing] the Law by the Nose”:
Shakespeare’s Revisions of Fear and
Punishment
Anne-Marie Miller-Blaise
1 In a  world ridden with what  may seem to be new fears,  we are tempted to turn to
Shakespeare’s plays as we turn to a sacred text, hoping to find providential lessons and
words of comfort, for Shakespeare too lived in a time rife with religious tensions and
anxieties about plots and treasons – we desire Shakespeare to be both a prophet and “our
contemporary.” Perhaps it would be fairer to say that as scholars, eager to exert just a
little more critical distance than that, we turn to Shakespeare in the same way as Patrick
Boucheron  recently  turned  to  Ambrogio  Lorenzetti’s  frescoes  of  good  and  bad
government in the Palazzo Pubblico of Siena, enquiring whether they might teach us how
to “avert fear” – “conjurer la peur.”1 For Boucheron, the fires, the unruly soldiers, the
desiccated fields that are glimpsed on the western wall, supposedly depicting the effects
of bad government – or the antithesis of the Republic – in fact translate and materialize
the anxiety of the Republic – the slow, inevitable subversion of civic values from within. 
2 The “troubled” “heavens” of Macbeth (2.4.6),2 the wind, rain, and thunder of King Lear, the
“o’erflowing Nilus” (1.2.42) of Antony and Cleopatra bespeak the diseased state of other
common weal about to turn common woe. Boucheron asks whether the frescoes will in
effect ward off fear – “le danger sera-t-il écarté?” – and immediately responds in the
negative to his own question: “les images n’ont pas ce pouvoir […] la force politique des
images consiste précisément à ne rien dérober au regard” (“images do not have that
power […] the political power of images consists precisely in concealing nothing from the
eye,” my translation).3 Of course, 1606 England is not 1338 Siena, anymore than it is our
2017  more  globalized  political  stage,  but  might  we  suppose  that  the  power  of
Shakespeare’s theatre consists precisely in not concealing anything from the eye, that it
addresses fear by becoming a theatre of fears? If so, how does Shakespeare represent fear
and what does he do with fear? Does he seek to play with fear or create fear? Does he
attempt to deconstruct or demystify fear? My particular focus in this paper will be on the
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dialectics of fear and punishment and the way Shakespeare’s dramaturgy questions both
the fear of punishment and punishment as an effective response to fear. I approach these
questions through three different lenses, a Foucauldian one, a Hegelian one, and finally
through the definitions that are given to fear in early modern religious literature, which
appear to be more pertinent in delineating the implications of Shakespeare’s dramatic
treatment of fear.
3 In the Year of Lear (a year of fear), James Shapiro argues that it is “no coincidence” if
“[t]he year 1606 would turn out to be a good one for Shakespeare and an awful one for
England” for the playwright “grasped the dramatic potential of popular reaction to the
plot: a maelstrom of fear, horror, a desire for revenge, an all-too-brief sense of national
unity, and a struggle to understand where such evils came from.”4 As I started piecing out
chastisement scenes that seemed to dramatize the complex interworking of fear with
punishment, I was drawn, like Shapiro, to the three great tragedies, Macbeth, King Lear,
and Antony and Cleopatra, presumably written in 1606 in the aftermath of the Gunpowder
Plot, as well as Measure for Measure, an earlier play, but written quite shortly after the
1603 Main Plot, to which it may well relate. These four plays undoubtedly stage fears,
show some of the ways fears are dealt with, and – most importantly for my purpose –
attempt  to  inflict  punishment  upon  traitors.  Chastisement  scenes  are  more  or  less
prominent in each one of these plays. Sometimes they relate only to secondary characters
or inset plots, or are even reduced to a very short, reported story within the play, as is the
case with the execution of the treacherous Thane of Cawdor in Macbeth. Other times they
constitute the play’s “grand finale,” as is the case with Measure for Measure, even though
here the expected executions are overturned in extremis thanks to the Duke’s pardon. 
4 Put  together,  these  scenes  of  chastisement,  execution,  or  reprieve,  suggest  that
punishment  is  ineffective  in  deterring  from  further  wrong-doing  (Macbeth  is  not
instructed, for instance, by the example of Cawdor’s treason and execution) and that
punishment is ineffective in putting an end to fear, for fear breeds hate which, in turn,
breeds more fear. Charmian’s warning to her mistress Cleopatra that “In time we hate
that which we often fear” may well apply beyond matters of love (1.3.14). Later in the
play, at the end of act 3, when Antony is defeated, and at the very moment when
Enobarbus is about to turn traitor to his master, the servant sheds light upon another
troubling aspect of the mechanism of fear in which the fearlessness and valour of the epic
hero, turned tragic, are in fact only a higher level of fear, or fear “in her most exalted
mood.”5 “Furious” – that is, seemingly heroic – cruelty grows from the seeds of fear:
ENOBARBUS. To be furious, 
Is to be frighted out of fear; and in that mood
The dove will peck the estridge; and I see still,
A diminution in our captain’s brain
Restores his heart: when valour preys on reason,
It eats the sword it fights with. (3.13.227) 
5 The  description  of  Antony  by  Enobarbus  curiously  echoes  the  glorious  portrait  the
captain gives of Macbeth in the liminal lines of the play, suggesting perhaps a secret
terror that has yet to be externalized and dramatized in the passage from the heroic
account to the direct staging of Macbeth’s troubled spirit:
For brave Macbeth (well he deserves that name)
Disdaining Fortune, with his brandish’d steel,
Which smok’d with bloody execution,
Like Valour’s minion, carv’d out his passage (1.1.18-21)
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6 What frightens Enobarbus into treason or desertion is in fact Antony’s more awesome
fear. He does not attempt to hedge himself against the same type of chastisement as the
one just undergone before his eyes by Thidias, Caesar’s servant, violently whipped by
Antony and Cleopatra for bringing bad news. Ironically, Enobarbus will not be punished
for deserting his master but kill himself for not having been punished by his master.
Though punishment does not dispel fear (whether the fear of the wrong-doer or the
righter of wrongs), mercy is not restorative either: it only underscores, by contrast, the
vileness of the traitor.
7 Punishment in early modern plays has largely been explored in the past couple of decades
by a rich literature of historicist readings building on a Foucauldian perspective.6 Violent
punishment is read as a ritual performance enabling political control, a subsuming of
discordant bodies into the great body politic as traitors and trespassers are tortured or
dismembered to be better reintegrated or absorbed in spectacles where the awesome
display of power is not systematically exclusive of carnavalesque festivity.7 Prospero, sole
ruler of the island, compares the “afeared” monstrous Caliban, who dreads him more
than he dreads the dark Setebos, to beecombs or wax which he has to pinch into form
through corporeal forms of punishment (1.3.386). Physical punishment and torture are
performed publicly not only as a spectacular warning to others but because they are the
performative means of  the exercise  of  power,  which is  also an exercise  of  fear.  The
bloodiest of Shakespeare’s plays, it is argued, blur the distinction between the theatre and
the scaffold as a space of performance, building on the model of the Elizabethan revenge
tragedy and its gusto for executions, however in a somewhat more subdued vein.8 The
Shakespearean theatre reenacts the ritual of punishment while keeping it at a certain
distance to better bring it into the limelight, revealing its most subtle mechanisms. 
8 Though it stages the political assassination of one who is a threat to the body and the laws
of the Roman Republic, and not a chastisement ordered by the application of a penal
code,  Julius  Caesar shows  Shakespeare  pinpointing  already  at  an  early  stage  the
impossibility for the performance of the physical ritual of power not to be at once an act
of butchery. The violent act of revenge that the plebeians unfairly commit against the
poet Cinna (3.3), for bearing the same name as one of the conspirators, only furthers, on a
burlesque  and fully  indiscriminate  mode,  the  butchery  of  the  political  assassination.
Though fear is part and parcel of such analyses focusing on the tyrannical control of
rebellious or extravagant bodies by the body politic (in turn legitimate or illegitimate), it
is apprehended mostly as part of the mechanics of the exercise of power, and is largely
erased as a “mood”, to use Enobarbus’s term. We are given a commanding view of how
the use of fear or terror plays into the exercise of power, but it is seldom explored from
within or for itself. To find a more intimate view of the dialectics of fear and punishment,
we need to revert to the former, longer Romantic trend of criticism that developed out of
Hegel’s  readings  of  Shakespeare,  privileging  the  study  of  the  Shakespearean  moral
imagination, which remained current down to Harold Bloom.
9 In “Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate,” Hegel uses Macbeth as an example to distinguish
the moral law, expressed in the penal code and generating a fear of something “alien,”
from “fate as punishment,” which the philosopher describes as a fear or “awe” of oneself.
For  Hegel,  the  trespasser’s  experience of  fear,  when submitted to  the penal  code,  is
always embodied by another person, i.e., the executor of the sentence or the “lord of this
reality.”9 This  dread,  just  as  the  prospect  of  punishment  that  sparks  it,  is  absolute,
because alien, and is equated with a fear of death, the ultimate fear. The penal law offers
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a  moral  horizon  and  an  incentive  to  moral  betterment;  it  rests  upon  a  belief  in
deontological  and  teleological  system as  it  lays  the  foundations  for  duty-driven and
purpose-driven action but it does not lay the basis for a truly ethical life in Hegel’s view.10
In the contemplation of one’s fate, on the other hand, life itself becomes its own enemy.
Macbeth, the eponymous protagonist of Shakespeare’s most clearly “frightful” tragedy
(in that it most explicitly refers to fear than any other in the Shakespearean corpus,
rendering with great precision down to the physiological symptoms of fear), stands to a
certain extent for both of these types of fear and of punishment. Macbeth clings onto the
witches’ prophecy as to the penal law, making their ominous, sentence-like prophecies
the rule of his action – in Hegel’s own terms, Macbeth “clung to alien Beings, and so in
their service had to trample and slay everything holy in human nature, had at last to be
forsaken by his gods (since these were objects and he their slave) and be dashed to pieces
on his faith itself.”11 
10 At the same time, he stands on the brink of embodying the modern tragic hero, as his fear
opens onto a metaphysical experience in which he becomes an enemy and stranger to
himself. His famous comment that “Life’s but a walking shadow” (5.5.24) in the last stages
of the play articulates not only the baroque topos of the ephemeral and illusory quality of
life, but also what Hegel later calls the nullification of one’s own life that comes in “fate as
punishment”: 
only through the killing of life, is something alien produced. Destruction of life is
not the nullification of life but its diremption,12 and the destruction consists in its
transformation  into  an  enemy.  It  is  immortal,  and,  if  slain,  it  appears  as  its
terrifying ghost which vindicates every branch of life and lets loose its Eumenides.
The illusion of trespass, its belief that it destroys the other’s life and thinks itself
enlarged thereby, is dissipated by the fact that the disembodied spirit of the injured
life comes on the scene against the trespass, just as Banquo who came as a friend to
Macbeth was not blotted out when he was murdered but immediately thereafter
took  his  seat,  not  as  a  guest  at  the  feast,  but  as  an  evil  spirit.  The  trespasser
intended to have to do with another’s life, but he has only destroyed his own, for
life  is  not  different  from  life,  since  life  dwells  in  the  single  Godhead.  In  his
arrogance  he  has  destroyed  indeed,  but  only  the  friendliness  of  life;  he  has
perverted life into an enemy.13
11 The excess of fear and the fear of self collide with a senseless fearlessness in which life is
“its terrifying ghost”: 
I have almost forgot the taste of fears
The time has been, my senses would have cooled
To hear a night-shriek, and my fell of hai
Would at a dismal treatise rouse and stir
As life were in’t: I have supp’d full with horrors;
Direness, familiar to my slaughterous thoughts
Cannot once start me. — (5.5.9-15)
12 But it is precisely because life appears “as its terrifying ghost,” that this experience of
frightful self-estrangement can also give way to a transformation, transcending both fear
and punishment, and offer the premises for an ethical life founded on moral imagination.
Hegel uses in other places the example of Auteur0000-00-00T00:00:00AHamlet.14 “To be or
not to be” is an unsolvable question: Hamlet cannot choose life over death or death over
life. Unlike the hero of classical tragedy, he cannot commit the envisioned suicide nor
even blind himself, submitting himself to penal-like punishment. He is trapped in fear
and condemned to contemplate his life as an enemy through the process of sublation. 
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13 Hegel’s reading of the two types of fear and two types of punishment is compelling but
problematic notably because of his association of penal punishment and the law to “the
spirit of the Jewish people”, as opposed to “fate as punishment”, which keys into the idea
of grace that participates in the “Spirit of Christianity.” We cannot deny, however, that
discourses on fear, as well as the very experience of fear itself, were already articulated in
religious  terms  in  Shakespeare’s  day.  A  contextualization  of  notions  of  fear  in
relationship to punishment in the early modern period and especially in the Christian
doctrine of Reformation England may provide a better basis for understanding what sort
of dialectics of fear and punishment are really at stake in Shakespeare’s plays and what
Shakespeare does with fear. 
14 The tension between two types of  fear described by Hegel  is  in fact  inherent in the
religious thought of the early modern period, and its complex typology of the different
kinds of fear, both holy and unholy, charted with much more psychological finesse than
we tend to realize in theological texts. One may argue that looking towards soteriological
teachings and spiritual comfort literature does not have much to do with the English legal
system, its enforcement of punishment and the fears it might have fostered in the early
modern period. However, because crimes of treason became more than ever religious
crimes against royal supremacy with the Main Plot and the Gunpowder Plot, and because
England  developed  a  special  penal  code  to  uphold  the  establishment  of  its  national
Church  throughout  the  Elizabethan  and  early  Stuart  periods,  at  a  symbolical  and
imaginary level at least, the fear of eternal damnation was in many ways redoubled if not
fused with the dread of legal punishment and its executor. Looking more closely at the
echoes to spiritual discourses on fear Shakespeare weaves into his plays, enables us to
move  beyond  the  acknowledgment  of  the  impressive  spectacle  of  violence  and
punishment to look at what Shakespeare does with, or to, fear, a disposition which is so
inward that, despite its symptoms, it is difficult to fully denote on stage. I would like to
suggest that one of the things Shakespeare does with fear is that he subtly shows how the
trespasser often embodies or materializes not his own fears but the fears of the executor,
thereby revealing, through a system of dramatic reverberation, that trespass, including
treason, is not an easy thing to define and that the law (and more specifically the godly
law of  the godly kingdom of  England)  in fact  generates its  own ghosts  and dangers.
Shakespeare  does  not  deconstruct  the  law  nor  explicitly  advocate  a  different  penal
system than the one prevailing in the society to which he belongs but, as is the case with
Lorenzetti’s  frescoes  of  the  effects  of  good  and  evil  government  as  analyzed  by
Boucheron, he does not shut his eye on fear, however inward and inherent it is in the
executor himself.15
15 Fear,  in the early modern experience,  is  first  and foremost  the fear  of  death as  the
moment of ultimate judgment. Few people in Shakespeare’s age would have been inclined
to follow Francis Bacon’s opinion according to which “Nothing is terrible except fear
itself.”16 Such  an  attitude  might  have  been  seen  as  characterizing the  fearless  self-
confidence of atheists, whom no prospect of judgment could frighten (Mark Antony and
Macbeth  seem  to  epitomize  the  irreverent  pride  and  Icarian  motif  that  was  also
associated  with  the  figure  of  the  atheist  in  early  modern  culture).  Robert  Burton
articulates two of the prevalent ideas on the matter in his Anatomy of Melancholy when,
dealing first with religious melancholy,  he suggests that Catholic soteriology leads to
despair because of the frightful perspective of the hardships of purgatory and, beyond
purgatory, eternal punishment in hell.17 Criticizing the teachings of the Council of Trent,
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he asks:  “good God,  how many men have been miserably  afflicted by this  fiction of
Purgatory?”18 While pre-Reformation depictions of purgatory in church frescoes were
notably  geared  at  frightening  believers  into  good  actions  (and  the  necessity  of
intercession), it is illusory to think that such representations were not indexed upon a
more complex understanding of fear and punishment, as it is illusory to think that in
whitewashing these frescoes,  Protestant  iconoclasts erased the fear  of  last  judgment.
Stephen Greenblatt has attempted to demonstrate that Shakespeare’s stage functioned in
part  as  a  substitute  for  such  visual  depictions  of  purgatory  in  becoming  a  sort  of
performance of a purgatorial space and furnishing the lost visual support.19 
16 One of the most brilliant testimonies of the fear aroused by the prospect of judgment is
perhaps the collection of “Holy Sonnets” by John Donne, in which the persona quakes
with fear as he comes face to face with death: 
I run to death, and death meets me as fast,
And all my pleasures are like yesterday.
I dare not move my dim eyes any way;
Despair behind, and death before doth cast
Such terror, and my feeble flesh doth waste
By sin in it, which it towards hell doth weigh. (sonnet 13, l. 3-8)20
17 However, the sonnet sequence reveals that it is not only this vision of purgatory, where
sins are weighed, that frightens the poet’s soul. He is equally terrified by what could be
interpreted as a sentence of predestination to damnation, the anxiety that “thou […] wilt
not choose me” (sonnet 1, l. 13) or the baffling consideration that “if serpents envious /
Cannot be damned; alas, why should I be?” (sonnet 5, l. 3-4). This gestures towards types
of fears generated at the other end of the religious spectrum, signaled again by Robert
Burton – the way Reformation doctrine, and especially double-predestinarianism, with
the hiatus it introduces between crime and punishment, could be conducive of greater
fears yet than the belief in the purifying punishments of purgatory.21 
18 In fact, one finds a striking continuity between pre-Reformation and post-Reformation
understandings  and  classifications  of  fear,  preparing  for  the  late  sixteenth-century
Puritan or  Godly emphasis  on the very positive notion of  the “god-fearing” and the
opposition  between  holy  types  of  fear  and  sinful  or  interdicted  types  of  fear.  The
distinction between “filial” and “servile” fear was formulated in scholastic thought.22
Whereas “servile fear” (a taxonomy that foreshadows Hegel’s own analysis) is the mere
fear of punishment that may be felt by a servant towards his master, “filial fear” is alike
to  the  reverence  a  child  may feel  for  his  parent.  Catholic  writers  of  the  very  early
Reformation period in England, such as William Bonde, in his 1534 A deuoute epystle of
treaty for them that ben tymorouse and fearefull in conscience, advised that holy fear lead to
the exercise of charity. Servile fear, on the other hand, risked being indiscreetly used and
would then displease God.23 It seems that the idea of the use of servile fear as a dubious
political tool may be contained within such an understanding. Roger Edgeworth in a 1540
sermon entreating to “godly fear” distinguished more finely between “carnal and worldly
fear” of losses in this life, “servile fear” of punishment in hell, and “filial and charitable
fear” thanks to which “servile fear” is abolished.24 Interestingly, however, the experience
of “servile fear” was not all together ill, in that it could gradually lead to a better sense of
justice and a turn of the soul toward filial fear. Protestant reformers were going to use
these distinctions and ambiguities to forward a different soteriology. But both traditions
testify to the growing turn “inward” of  spirituality in the sixteenth century and the
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consideration of natural fear as an element that needed to be addressed and be eased by
theologies of comfort and instruction on well-dying. 
19 William  Perkins,  the  prime  Calvinist  theologian  of  the  later  Elizabethan  Protestant
Church, seemingly polarizes the typology of fear by contrasting holy fear and “forbidden
fear,” which is when one looks only to the punishment without consideration for the
ethical value of one’s acts. In his Whole Treatise of the cases of conscience he defines “feare”
in general as a Christian “inward” virtue pertaining to the believer’s adoration of God,
along with Obedience, Patience, and Thankfulness. Holy fear, for him, is “not a feare of
the offence alone, but of the offence and punishment together, and of the offence in the
first place” whereas forbidden or sinful fear is that “of punishment alone.”25 He is also
intent on turning his treatise into a work of consolation as well as of admonition, for, as a
theologian and pastor,  he  seeks  to  take into  account  the psychological  needs  of  the
faithful. Thus, he recognizes that there can be more natural forms of fear. He carefully
explains that fear can arise either from a disturbed conscience or from a disturbed
imagination but that it is not always easy for the fearful person to distinguish between
the two. In the first case, fear derives from sin and can only be cured by Christ, but in the
second case it  derives from melancholy distempers,  or pathologies,  and can be cured
thanks to the intervention of Physicians: 
Therefore the fourth and last helpe, is the arte of Physick, which serues to correct
and abate the humour, because it is a meanes by the blessing of God, to restore the
health, and to cure the distemper of the bodie. And thus much touching the trouble
of mind, caused by Melancholy.26
20 In both Catholic and Protestant early modern understandings of fear,  the moment of
punishment, bet it only moderate chastisement or an execution, becomes a moment of
trial, a test of the believer’s repentance. If the trespasser wants to die well, he must shun
and overcome the sinful fear of his impending punishment, showing instead reverence
(or holy fear) for God. From a Catholic perspective then, dying well, becomes one of the
means  to  salvation.  From  a  predestinarian  perspective,  the  trespasser’s  ability  to
surmount his natural fears and demonstrate reverent fear of God instead becomes one of
the legible signs of his salvation. 
21 Macbeth can be read along the lines of such early modern typologies of fear. Testimony of
godly fear at the hour of death, or, at least, testimony of the spectacle of a godly death, is
given from an early stage of the play as a foil for “brave Macbeth” who “disdains fortune
with  his  brandish’d  steel”  (1.2.18-19),  when  Malcolm  recounts  the  traitor  Cawdor’s
execution:
DUNCAN. Is execution done on Cawdor? Are not
Those in commission yet returned?
MALCOLM. My liege,
They are not yet come back. But I have spoke
With one that saw him die: who did report
That very frankly he confess’d his treasons,
Implored your highness’ pardon and set forth
A deep repentance: nothing in his life
Became him like the leaving it; he died
As one that had been studied in his death
To throw away the dearest thing he owed,
As ’twere a careless trifle. (1.4.1-12)
22 Duncan’s ambiguous reply, however, to this reported testimony casts a shadow on this
ultimate expression of master- and god-fearingness. “There’s no art / To find the mind’s
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construction in  the face,”  he declares  (1.4.13-14).  But  is  he speaking about  Cawdor’s
unexpected treason here, or the moment of the ultimate, godly spectacle of his death? 
23 Though Shakespeare situates the action of his play far before the days of the Reformation,
this  inserted  narrative  of  a  scene  of  punishment  and  repentance  calls  to  mind  late
sixteenth-century accounts of executions, such as that of the Jesuit priest and poet Robert
Southwell, a close friend of Henry Garnet, superior of the English Jesuit Mission from 1586
on,  who,  despite  his  efforts  to  discourage  Robert  Catesby  from  carrying  out  the
Gunpowder  Plot,  was  also  accused of  treason,  tried and executed in  1606.  The main
charge in Garnet’s case was that of equivocation, as he had heard Catesby’s intentions at
confession but had not warned the crown directly, keeping the information under the
seal  of  confessional.  While Garnet’s  trial  has repeatedly been linked to Shakespeare’s
treatment  of  equivocation  in  Macbeth,  the  account  of  Southwell’s  1595  torture  and
execution  offers  an  unnoticed  parallel  to  the  short  inserted  story  of  the  Thane  of
Cawdor’s execution. Arrested by Topcliffe in 1592 for treason, i.e., for having practiced
Catholic rites in private homes in England, Southwell was in fact the first Jesuit to be
charged  with  equivocation27 and  was  finally  sentenced  to  death  three  years  later.
Testimonies of Southwell’s torture and execution reveal that all witnesses, including a
vast majority of Protestants, were impressed by his admirable behavior. Accounts stress
his  fortitude,  his  ability  to  overcome  his  fears,  and,  therefore,  to  manifest  his  true
devotion.28 This impression was apparently shared even by the executioners, who, stirred
to pity, would have pulled on his legs to help him die faster after the hanging and before
the disembowelment and quartering, usually performed on the agonizing but still living
traitor. Unlike Cawdor, he did not confess to treason but only to have been a Catholic
priest and true believer. Yet, similarly to Cawdor, “Nothing in his life” became it “like his
leaving it.”
24 In contrast to these spectacles of repentance or stoic enduring, Macbeth’s sinful fears, in
which he seems to be paradoxically fearless of any sort of punishment, may be inspired
by the devil.  From a stark predestinarian perspective,  the physiological  symptoms of
dread he experiences could be seen to reveal his predestined damnation. The symptoms
are poignantly described by the damned character himself when he speaks of the “horrid
image” of the still unaccomplished murder of Duncan which haunts his mind as soon as
he is made Thane of Cawdor, “unfix[ing] his hair” and “mak[ing] [his] seated hear knock
at [his] ribs” (1.3.145-146), or yet in the unnatural vision he has of the dagger in which his
eyes are “made the fools o’ th’other senses” (2.1.51). This is not to say that Shakespeare
adheres to such a reading but he dramatizes it as one of the possible readings. The final
couplet of Macbeth’s dagger soliloquy, which “summons” Duncan “heaven or to hell”,
seems  to  mime the  arbitral  sentence  of  the  predestinarian  God,  unless  these  horrid
images  are  only  the  symptoms of  a  distempered imagination.  Symbolically,  Macbeth
embodies at once the traitor, trespasser and damned sinner, ridden with fears signaling
his damnation, and the executor of another man’s sentence. If he prefers to slay both
guards and king at night in their sleep, it is perhaps never to contemplate his own image
and dread in the terrified faces of his victims. Through the overlapping of the figure of
the  damned  traitor  and  the  executor,  Shakespeare  does  by  no  means  endorse  a
predestinarian understanding of fear. Rather, he chooses not to close his eyes upon these
anxieties and reveals on stage how these anxieties and imaginings may in fact be born
from within the system of values that allegedly tries to keep these same anxieties at bay. 
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25 Interestingly,  in  the  final  act  of  the  play,  the  doctor’s  diagnosis  concerning  Lady
Macbeth’s illness, recalls the careful distinction in contemporary theological literature
between natural fear or melancholy, that can be “abated” by the physician through God’s
blessing, and unnatural or sinful fear, against which the physician is powerless: 
Foul whisperings are abroad: unnatural deeds
Do breed unnatural troubles: infected minds
To their deaf pillows will discharge their secrets:
More needs she the divine than the physician.
God, God forgive us all! Look after her;
Remove from her the means of all annoyance,
And still keep eyes upon her. So, good night:
My mind she has mated, and amazed my sight.
I think, but dare not speak. 
26 Whether they are damned or  not  –  Shakespeare cares  little  to determine so –,  both
Macbeth and Lady  Macbeth have  come to  embody the  monstrous  ghosts  of  a  social
structure that feeds on and fuels its own fears.
27 The early modern typology of  holy fear and sinful  fear may again furnish a key for
reading  the  scene  of  Gloucester’s  violent  blinding  in  King  Lear.  The  violence  of  the
chastisement led many, including Samuel Beckett, to believe that this scene was virtually
unstageable as such. Yet, the violence of this punishment is mitigated when compared to
the early modern practice of hanging, training, and quartering traitors. Plucking out the
eyes of a trespasser was a medieval treatment inflicted upon traitors and adulterers, as it
was a common punishment used against early Christians. The symbolism of the type of
chastisement  Shakespeare  chooses  is  in  any  case  multilayered:  while  it  identifies
Gloucester  as  a  traitor  to  Lear’s  daughters,  it  may  also  discreetly  reminisce  the
character’s adultery of old (that which lead him to give birth to his natural son Edmund),
and  signal  his  ultimate  identity  as  a  stoic  and  true  Christian,  undergoing  unfair
persecution. Gloucester remains remarkably calm throughout the ordeal, at least if we
follow the speech indicators rather than later stagings of the play. The dissipation of the
physiological  symptoms of  fear  show him to  have  become truly  repentant  and god-
fearing: “O my follies! Then Edgar was abused / Kind gods, forgive me that and prosper
him” (3.7.97-98).
28 Regan’s use, on the other hand, of exclamations and the haltering rhythm of her speeches
betray that she is more frightened than the victim of her punishment: “Wherefore to
Dover?”,  “filthy  traitor”,  “how  now,  dog”.  While  her  name  etymologically  suggests
kingship, it may also derive from the Gaelic Irish adjective ríodhgach, meaning “furious.”
Her anger turns into dread, preventing her from responding to Gloucester’s question
right after she has cut off a piece of his beard:
These hairs which thou dost ravish from my chin 
Will quicken, and accuse thee. I am your host. 
With robber's hands my hospitable favours 
You should not ruffle thus. What will you do? (3.7.39-42)
29 To a certain extent, it is Gloucester himself who verbally performs his own punishment
before Regan and Cornwall actually blind him when he explains that he sent Lear to
Dover to protect him from the type of chastisement he himself is about to endure:
Because I would not see thy cruel nails 
Pluck out his poor old eyes; nor thy fierce sister 
In his anointed flesh stick boarish fangs. (3.7.59-61)
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30 Gloucester’s fear is all inward and godly, as he calls upon himself a punishment he takes
in the end to be a godsend. Most stagings of the horrific scene highlight the gory quality
of the mutilation, in keeping with accepted ideas about the Elizabethan relish for blood
on stage.  Yet,  directors  might be more faithful  to Gloucester’s  ultimate stoicism and
acceptance as translated by the text in showing him with his back to the audience and
concealing his hideously mutilated face to let the audience read instead the horror on the
faces of  his  punishers.  Gloucester has indeed acted treacherously towards Regan and
Cornwall  but  what  he comes  to  materialize and  reveal,  are  the  sinful  fears  of  the
executors. 
31 Similar reverberations occur in two chastisement scenes in Antony and Cleopatra, though
they  concern  much  more  secondary  characters  and  bring  together  a  sense  of  the
burlesque in association with violence. The first one takes place, or nearly takes place,
soon after Antony is “bound unto Octavia” (2.5.69) by marriage. A messenger is sent to
Cleopatra’s court to bring her the news. Though he is no traitor and only an informer, he
is immediately confused by Cleopatra with the contents of the message he bears. She
strikes him and promises to perpetrate upon him the same chastisement as Regan and
Corwall inflicted upon Gloucester: “Hence horrible villain, or I’ll spurn thine eyes, / Like
balls before me! I’ll  unhair thy head” (2.5.77-78).  The second one,  already mentioned
above at the beginning of the present essay, occurs at the end of act 3 when Thidias, he
too a herald of ill fate who has been sent to try to convince Cleopatra to rally Octavius
Caesar, is whipped before Enobarbus. His face is made to reflect and make visible the
executors’ fear once more: “Whip him fellows,” orders Antony, “Till like a boy you see
him cringe his face / And whine aloud for mercy” (3.13.121-123). All of these plays then,
Macbeth,  King  Lear,  and Antony  and  Cleopatra,  presumably  written in  the  wake of  the
Gunpowder Plot and testifying to the fears of a nation suspicious of further religious
treasons, show how difficult it is to pronounce fair judgment and enact fair punishment,
for who can tell whether their fears are sinful or holy in the end? Whether these are
caused  by  the  criminal’s  conscience  or  simply  by  a  disturbed  imagination?  Indeed,
“There’s no art / To find the mind’s construction in the face.” Or who can say whether
the fears of the punished are not simply the ghosts of the fears generated by the body
politic but which sustains its structure and cohesion thereby? Traitors themselves may
secretly be the temples of godly fears or, when their fears are mostly unnatural, they may
become in  the  face  of  their  impending damnation,  models  of  the  deepening of  self-
consciousness, which stands at the beginning of the ethical life, according to Hegel.
32 Measure for Measure, written a few years earlier, in 1603 or 1604, also gives shape to an
impending sense of danger and pervasive fear. At one level, it may be read as allegorizing
the discovery of the Main Plot leading to the sentences to death of Lord Cobham, Griffin
Marham, and Walter Raleigh (represented by the slanderer Lucio in the play) for treason,
though these  men would  obtain  reprieves  for  various  reasons.  Shakespeare  satirizes
Angelo's, or the Duke deputy’s use of the moral law to his own personal benefit. He stands
as the figure of the Puritan hypocrite who “bites the law by the nose” (3.1.119) in self-
interest.29 Claudio, who is condemned at an early stage in the play and sentenced to death
for fornication, at first seems to embody the cool stoicism of one who knows he has not in
fact committed a sin: “If I must die, / I will encounter darkness as a bride / And hug it in
my arms” (3.1.89-91). But the prospect of his impending death makes him lose faith and
fall prey to “the fear of death,” to the point that he even encourages his own sister to sin
in order to save him:
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Ay, but to die, and go we know not where
[…] ’tis too horrible.
The weariest and most loathed worldly life
That age, ache, penury, and imprisonment 
Can lay on nature is a paradise
To what we fear of death.
[…]
What sin you do to save a brother’s life,
Nature dispenses with the deed so far
That it becomes a virtue. (3.1.129, 139-143, 146-148).
33 The only character to remain unimpressed by his own death sentence is Barnardine, a
murderer,  who  is  to  replace  Claudio  secretly  on  the  scaffold.  When  Abhorson,  the
executioner, comes to fetch him in his cell, Barnardine is drunk. But this in fact turns out
to be less of a carnavalesque gesture of resistance to the fear of death than a clever
technique  to  escape  the  death  penalty.  Well  versed  in  the  religious  culture  of
Shakespeare’s one times, Barnardine knows that a drunk man cannot be put to death in a
state  of  semi-conscience,  which  would  obscure  whether  he  is  ultimately  justified  or
reprobate.30 As the Duke in disguise himself declares: “A creature unprepared, unmeet for
death /  And to  transport  him in  the  mind he  is  /  Were  damnable”  (4.3.49-51).  The
terrifying execution scene, which is the work of Angelo, who rules by fear and by the rod,
is ultimately overturned by the gracious pardon and mercy of Duke Vincentio, who stands
as the ultimate figure of Justice and the double for King James I. 
34 Yet, the Duke’s ambiguous attitude towards Lucio in the final lines of the play, betray that
Shakespeare is also keeping his eyes open on the secret fears of the royal double in his
play, of this all-too merciful executor. Lucio begs the duke not to be punished, for his
slander was “spok[en]” “but according to the trick” (5.1.529). The Duke himself has done
nothing but play a trick on everyone throughout the play. He ultimately “remits” Lucio’s
“other forfeits” but enforces the sentence to have him marry a “punk” which, for Lucio is
the equivalent of  a  “pressing to death,  whipping,  and hanging” (5.1.545).  The Duke’s
appeal to have his “pleasure herein executed” (5.1.544) nonetheless because “slandering a
prince deserves it” (5.1.546) may suggest that the only punishment he enforces in the end
testifies to his innermost fears. In sending most characters to a “worthier place” through
his mercy, but condemning Lucio to this abhorred marriage, Duke Vincentio, who seemed
to  stand  up  to  the  frightening,  Puritan  hypocritical  penal  code,  performs,  just  as
arbitrarily as the predestinarian God, sentences of salvation and damnation according to
his “pleasure.” 
35 Though mercy triumphs in this “problem” comedy, here, as in the tragedies written in
1606, all fears have not been dispelled. Shakespeare keeps an eye open on the anxieties
that are inherent in kingly mercy. Through the use of complex dramatic framing devices
based on mirror effects and reverberations, that turn the (supposed) trespassers into the
image of the executors’ fears, Shakespeare creates a special perspective, that is not unlike
the theatrical and strident effects built into the pictorial space of Lorenzetti’s frescoes,
enabling  the  viewer  to  look  at  Peace,  sitting  “on  her  podium,  so  beautiful  in  her
immaculate dress,”31 looking at her own ghosts on the western wall of the Sala dei Nove
of the Palazzo Pubblico in Siena.
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RÉSUMÉS
Cet article traite de la dialectique de la peur et du châtiment dans quatre pièces de Shakespeare
écrites dans le contexte de la conspiration principale (1603) et de la conspiration des poudres
(1606) :  Mesure  pour  mesure,  Macbeth,  Le  Roi  Lear,  Antoine  et  Cléopâtre.  Il  se  demande  ce  que
Shakespeare fait de et à la peur, en adoptant différentes approches critiques qui offrent, chacune,
une autre réponse à cette question.  L’accent sur la mécanique de l’exercice du pouvoir et  le
spectacle  du  corps  supplicié  mis  au  jour  dans  l’approche  foucaldienne  ne  permet  pas  de
véritablement aborder la peur comme une expérience ou une émotion vécue par le malfaiteur. Il
y est avant tout l’instrument d’une consolidation du corps-politique. La distinction hégélienne
entre la peur de la loi pénale et morale, et la peur plus profonde du destin ou de soi-même,
permet une meilleure exploration de l’expérience même de la peur, de la conscience morale, et
du processus menant de la peur et du châtiment vers un plus grand degré de conscience. Cet
article suggère, cependant, que le traitement dramatique que Shakespeare réserve à la peur est
mieux compris lorsque lu à la lumière de la pensée théologique de la peur et de ses tentatives
pour la rationaliser le plus finement possible. Shakespeare met en scène cette typologie de la
peur qui  lui  est  contemporaine mais pour mieux questionner la  foi  aveugle dans une justice
prétendument inspirée de la loi divine et montrer que l’angoisse du malfaiteur (supposé) devant
le châtiment est en réalité le reflet des peurs de l’exécuteur de la loi. 
This article focuses on the dialectics of fear and punishment in four plays by Shakespeare written
in the wake of either the Main Plot (1603) or the Gunpowder Plot (1606): Measure for Measure,
Macbeth, King Lear, and Antony and Cleopatra. It asks what Shakespeare’s dramaturgy does with fear
and to fear, using a variety of critical approaches that yield different responses to this question.
The Foucauldian emphasis on the mechanics of the exercise of power and the awesome display of
chastised  bodies  tends  to  by-pass  the  examination  of  fear  as  a  mood and experience  of  the
punished  trespasser,  considering  it  instead  as  an  instrument  put  to  the  service  of  the  body
politic. Hegel’s distinction between two types of fear, the fear of the penal code or moral law, and
a deeper fear of oneself or “fate as punishment,” enables us to probe deeper into the experience
of fear, the moral imagination, and the process leading from fear and punishment to a greater
degree of self-consciousness. This paper argues, however, that the implications of Shakespeare’s
dramatic treatment of fear are best understood when read in light of early modern theological
literature  and  its  attempts  to  finely  rationalize  the  experience  of  fear.  Shakespeare’s  plays
dramatize a contemporary typology of fear, undermining beliefs in a “native punishment” (Henry
V) and “God’s law”, better to show how the (supposed) trespassers are in fact the reflectors of the
executors’ fears.
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